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Intra-Industry Information Releases: Analysing Profit Warnings in 
the South African Market 





This paper examines whether intra-industry information transfers occur as a result of 
firm profit warning announcements, in the South African market. Profit warnings are 
announcements made by public companies in advance of their earnings 
announcements, indicating that profits will fall short of previously expected levels. 
Profit warnings are part of managers' voluntary disclosures. An information transfer 
is the process whereby information conveyed to the market about one firm (the 
announcing firm) conveys value-relevant information about other non-announcing 
firms, and is usually confined to firms in the same industry. The full sample of protit 
warnings was divided into those conveying firm specific information and those 
conveying industry-wide information, so as to enable analysis of each sub-sample. In 
addition, a cross-sectional regression analysis is performed on each sub-sample in 
order to establish the significance of various proposed factors affecting the returns of 
non-announcing firms. The key finding is that profit warning announcements 
conveying industry-wide information do result in significant intra-industry 
information transfers in the South African market. Whilst profit warning 
announcements conveying firm specific information appeared to be characterised by a 
market hesitant to react hastily, thus resulting in a drop in returns post announcement. 
Modest intra-industry information transference was observed in the firm specific sub-
sample. Finally, the cumulative abnormal returns of the announcing firms, the 
homogeneity of an industry and recent market sentiment were found to be significant 
in explaining the movements in the cumulative abnormal returns of the non-
announcing firms. 
Key words: Intra-industry information; Profit warnings; Firm announcements; 
Information transfers. 
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On an annual or semi-annual basis, listed firms release their financial reports to the 
public, detailing the earnings of the firm over the last year or half year. Such reports 
are required to be disclosed by legislation in South Africa, so as to ensure that current 
shareholders are privy to pertinent information required to make informed decisions. 
Profit warnings are announcements made by public companies in advance of their 
earnings announcements, indicating that profits will fall short of previously expected 
levels. Profit warnings are part of managers' voluntary disclosures. An annual or 
semi-annual financial report is therefore not a profit warning. This paper is concerned 
with whether intra-industry information transfers occur as a result of firm profit 
warning announcements. An information transfer is the process whereby information 
conveyed to the market about one firm (the announcing firm) conveys value-relevant 
information about other non-announcing firms, and is usually confined to firms in the 
same industry (Ball, 2001). The question to be asked then is: Do profit warnings 
convey industry-wide information in South Africa? This paper attempts to provide an 
answer by analysing the returns of announcing and non-announcing firms in relation 
to the returns that would be expected in that industry prior to the profit warning. 
Many studies have examined the effects of other forms of disclosures on the prices of 
securities I. Defeo (1986) examined the markets reaction to earnings announcements, 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) studied stock split announcements, 
announcements of common stock and securities convertible into common stock were 
examined by Szewczyk (1992) and bankruptcy announcements were researched by 
Lang and Stulz (1992). There is very little research focused on profit warnings, 
perhaps because warnings were seldom issued until the late 1990s. This paper focuses 
on profit 'warnings, not actual earnings announcement or forecasts earnings. 
Collett (2004) looked at the unexpected trading volume for the eleven day period 
beginning five days before the profit warning and ending five days after the profit 
warning. He found that trading volume, and share price reactions, peaked on the day 
of the announcement and the day after. The other nine days were not found to show 
1 "Price movements reflect changes in the market's consensus expectations generated by a news 










statistically significant changes in the share price, suggesting that announcements are 
genuine surprises and that investors are able to assimilate new information quickly. In 
his study, examination of pre- and post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) showed no pre-announcement market anticipation of the announcements. 
Jackson & Madura's (2003) research of profit warnings disagrees with the findings of 
Collett. They claim that the signal conveyed in a profit warning is uncertain because 
the market may have anticipated the information from other news disseminated about 
a firn1, an industry, or the general economy. They show that prices begin to adjust 
about five days before a profit warning, and the market response is not complete until 
about five days after the warning. The accumulated response over the II-day period 
ending five days after the announcement is -21.7%2. They found that there is some 
evidence of information leakage before profit warnings, highlighted by the -2.38% 
abnormal share price response on average over the four days prior to the 
announcement. In addition, Jackson & Madura (2003) advise that investors must 
determine what a profit warning implies about cash flows beyond the quarter of 
immediate concern. 
Collett (2004) found in a study examining the pre- and post-announcement (CAR), 
that there is a positive abnormal return on the day after the announcement of negative 
trading news for the small company sub-sample, suggesting an initial over-reaction to 
the announcement. This appears to contradict Jackson & Madura's (2003) findings 
who argue that profit warning announcements elicit a strong negative market response 
that is "not sensitive to timing the warning in advance of the earnings announcement". 
Their research found that there is no evidence of a reversal after the period subsequent 
to the announcement suggesting that the immediate downward revaluation of share 
prices does not indicate a market over-reaction3. In addition, Collet (2004) found that 
with serial announcers, the second profit warning leads to a greater market reaction 
and, when companies have to make two consecutive negative statements in a six-
month period, the average abnormal returns are more than -30%. Similar results were 
2 The profit warning effect over the two-day announcement period is 32 times the valuation effect upon 
subsequent releases of the actual earnings. 
3 They also inferred that an under-reaction to a profit warning is usually followed by a period of 










found in research conducted by Han, Wild & Ramesh (1989) for announcements of 
earnings reports. 
Clinch & Sinclair (1987) assert that research delineating the economics of information 
asymmetry "provides insights into the dynamics of intra-industry interactions". Their 
research suggests that information transfers appear to be directional, meaning that an 
announcement that results in a positive (negative) change in the share price of the 
announcing firm, results in a positive (negative) change in the share price of other 
firms in the same industry. The results support Foster's (1981) conclusion that intra-
industry information transfers4 are associated with earnings releases and that they are, 
on average, directional. Helbok & Walker (2003) conducted similar research on profit 
warnings issued by UK companies where, much like South Africa, the economic and 
political environment is less litigious than the United States. They found that 50% of 
their sample of profit warnings contained quantitative information that resulted in 
significant intra-industry information transfers that were found to be directional. 
The direction of share price movements is thought to depend on the presence of two 
market forces, namely, the contagion and competitive effects. These market forces 
have been studied so as to assess the net impact of an announcement by a single firm. 
Lang & Stulz (1992) explain these two distinct concepts. "The contagion effect is 
epitomised when a pessimistic announcement released by a specific firm has a 
negative effect on the share prices of competing firms in the same industry". This may 
occur due the fact that pessimistic announcements reveal negative information about 
the components of cash flows that are common to all firms in the industry and, 
consequently decreases the market's expectation of the profitability of the industry's 
firms. "The competitive effect occurs when a pessimistic announcement increases the 
value of the non-announcing firms in the same industry" (Lang & Stulz, 1992). This is 
thought to occur because of the redistribution of wealth that occurs due to the 
announcing firm, possibly becoming less efficient. 
Szewczyk (1992) argues for a dominant contagion effect, suggesting that investors 
may infer the general prospects of an entire industry from an announcement as 










opposed to shifts in competitive advantage between competitors. In industries 
reporting more than one profit warning in a short time interval, Clinch & Sinclair 
(1987) found that the initial profit warning already conveys the majority of value 
relevant information about the industry as a whole (contagion effect), resulting in 
diminishing marginal profit warning effects. Lang & Stulz (1992) found contradictory 
results from their research, reporting that the competitive effect is dominant in 
industries where leverage and the degree of competitionS are low. Kohers (1999) 
concurs and indicated from his endeavours, the view that the level of competition in 
an industry is an important factor in explaining industry abnormal returns, as it 
increases the power of the competitive effect. 
Foster (1981) examined the effects of intra-industry information transfers resulting 
from earnings announcements. He delineates that the earnings of firms are affected by 
economics factors, industry factors and firm specific factors. Considering industry 
factors; analysts specializing in specific industries identify key variables that affect 
movements in industry profitability. Therefore the earnings announcements of one 
firm in an industry, represents a potential source of information about the impact of 
movements in these industry-wide variables. Analysts are able to identify movements 
in these key variables and form opinions about the industry-wide impact they may 
have. He found that in general, it was observed that a two-day 'abnormal return' for 
the non-announcing firms was observed. However, these abnormal returns were found 
to be much less than those observed for the earnings announcing firms. Han, Wild & 
Ramesh (1989) found that there are increased movements in returns for other firms in 
the same industry as announcing firms6. This appears to suggest the existence of 
significant industry-wide information conveyed in the earnings announcements of a 
single firm. 
Firth (1976) argues that investors have been using information (other than annual 
reports) to help predict financial performance prior to the publication of annual 
reports. Ball & Brown (1968) concur and state that of all the information about an 
individual firm which becomes available during a year, only 50% is captured in that 
5 Represented by the Herfindahl index. 
6 However, the movements were found to be unrelated in magnitude or direction to the announcing 










year's reported earnings figure. In addition, they found that of all the information 
contained in reported income, no more than about 10% to 15% had not been 
anticipated by the month of the report. Defeo (1986) agrees, asserting that interim 
reports are timelier than annual reports and can convey some of the information 
contained in the annual reports. Instead, Firth (1976) believes that amongst the major 
sources of data are: "profit warnings and utilising the financial results of closely 
competing firms to help forecast the forthcoming results of a company". He found 
that investors used the information obtained from competing firms to revaluate the 
appropriate share price of a particular firm. The adjustment of share prices was found 
to be almost immediate and in the direction expected. This appears to exemplify the 
industry-wide information contained in profit warning announcements. 
Han, Wild & Ramesh (1989) conducted a study exammmg the security return 
behaviour of firms that voluntarily release managers' earnings forecasts and the 
impact these disclosures had on other firms in the same industry. After removing 
industry cross-sectional co-variation in the forecast firms' security returns, they found 
that a significant portion of the information conveyed in such announcements is 
related to firm specific factors. This suggests that earnings announcements convey 
two distinct forms of information content, industry-wide information (as described by 
Firth (1976)) and firm-specific information. Jin (2004) studied the effects of both 
industry-wide factors and firm-specific factors on share prices by decomposing 
accounting earnings into expenses and revenues. He found that a negative accounting 
earnings report, conveying firm-specific factors, had a negative impact on the 
announcing firms share price but a positive impact on the share price of other firms in 
the same industry (competitive effect). It was also found that an announcement 
conveying industry-wide factors resulted in a positive correlation between the 
movements of returns of the announcing firm and the competing firms in the same 
industry (contagion effect). These results are in accordance with studies analysing 
intra-industry information transfers by Szewczyk (1992) and Tawatnuntachai & 
D'Mello (2002). 
The extent to which intra-industry information transfers occur is influenced by a 
confluence of factors (Jackson & Madura, 2003). Defeo (1986) investigated the speed 










such as firm SIze, reporting lag and report type. He found that the share pnce 
movements began earlier and lasted longer for bigger firms in comparison to smaller 
firms. Foster (1981) conducted research on sales, earnings and advertising 
expenditure announcements and the intra-industry information transfers that occur. 
His research found that the level of competition for market share was particularly 
pertinent in industries, and that highly competitive industries experience more 
pronounced information transference. Kohers (1999) found that the effects of 
announcements were more profound within homogenous industries, defined in his 
studies as regulated industries including banks and utilities. Jackson & Madura (2003) 
carried out research into the effects of profit warnings released at various times 
leading up to compulsory annual reports. They found that the mean two day CAR of 
the firms that issued profit warnings more than one month in advance is -15.25%, 
versus -13.64% for firms that issued profit warnings less than one month in advance. 
The difference between the means was found to be statistically insignificant; therefore 
they inferred that there are no differences as a result of the timing of the profit 
warning announcement. 
It may not be the case, that all forms of announcements by firms have significant 
impact on share prices and returns. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) investigated 
the information contained in the announcement of stock splits. They discovered that 
the stock splits themselves had no influence on share price movements, although the 
announcements did have an indirect influence on share prices through the increase of 
cash dividends. Ball & Brown (1968) found, in a study of 261 American firms and the 
impact annual report announcements have on share prices, that the actual release of 
the earnings announcements by the firms had relatively little impact on share prices. 
Szewczyk (1992) studied announcements of common stock and securities convertible 
into common stock. He found that responses to offering announcements of non-
convertible securities are typically negative 7 but not statistically significant. 
7 The announcement of an impending public offering seems to communicate unfavourable inside 
information about the announcing firm's value. The negative returns found by Szewczyk (1992) were 
confirmed by Ross (1977), who advanced a theory in which leverage-decreasing transactions, such as 
new issues of common stock and convertible securities, signal management's lack of confidence in the 










Many studies have been conducted to ascertain the incentives of voluntarily 
disclosing relevant information to the pUblic. The South African stock exchange 
contains several listing rules which dictate the appropriate disclosure practices. JSE 
Listing Rule 3.48 and JSE Listing Rule 3.99 are particularly relevant for the purposes 
of this paper. In general, directors can assess if the disclosure of information would 
lead to a substantial price movement. In addition, directors are able, if they desire 
(despite the requirement for prompt disclosure), to either fail to disclose before 
reporting financial results, delay disclosure, or disclose through a private disclosure 
channel (Skinner, 2004). 
Several factors may create an environment more conducive to voluntary disclosure. 
Skinner (1994) found that managers are more likely to release earnings forecasts if 
their respective firms are performing well. Whilst Dontoh (1989) showed that 
managers operating in oligopolistic markets are more likely to disclose both good and 
bad news, in an attempt to provide both good news to shareholders and bad news to 
competitors. Helbok & Walker (2003), focusing exclusively on profit warnings, found 
that the willingness of managers to disclose is associated with the permanence of the 
news. Darrough & Stoughton (1990) analysed the voluntary disclosure of proprietary 
information. They found that disclosed information can help the financial market in 
evaluating the firm's value more accurately; however it may also provide strategic 
information to potential competitors. Therefore the manager's decision to disclose is 
based on the effect of information on the assets market price. Darrough & Stoughton 
(1990) reveal that firms in less competitive industries may see no costs associated 
8 JSE Listing Rule 3A - under General Obligation of Disclosure states that the following provisions 
apply in respect of material price sensitive information: 
With the exception of trading statements, an issuer must, without delay, unless the information is 
kept confidential for a limited period of time in terms of paragraph 3.6, release an announcement 
providing details of any development(s) in such issuer's sphere of activity that is/are not public 
knowledge and which may, by virtue of its/their effect(s), lead to material movements of the 
reference price of such issuer's listed securities. 
9 With regards to Cautionary announcements Cautionary announcements listing rule 3.9 states that: 
Immediately after an issuer acquires knowledge of any material price sensitive information and the 
necessary degree of confidentiality of such information cannot be maintained or if the issuer 
suspects that confidentiality has or may have been breached, an issuer must publish a cautionary 
announcement (complying with paragraph IIAO). An issuer that has published a cautionary 
announcement must provide updates thereon in the required manner and within the time limits 










with making public disclosures. Their research suggests that full disclosure takes 
place when the market conditions are favourable enough to support two or more 
firms. This insinuates that the greater potential costs associated with non-disclosure in 
highly competitive markets, results in competition encouraging voluntary disclosure. 
Verrechia's (1983) results contradict the findings of Darrough et al concluding that 
product market competition may provide disincentives for voluntary disclosure 
through the competitive effect. 
Skinner (1994) found that on average, earnings related voluntary disclosures occur 
infrequently, approximately one disclosure for every ten quarterly earnings 
announcements 10. More specifically, he found that good news disclosures tend to be 
point or range estimates of earnings per share (EPS), whilst bad news disclosures 
were usually qualitative statements concerning the current quarter's earnings. Collett 
(2004) studied the quantitative reports released by firms, finding that the proportion of 
companies disclosing quantitative updates is relatively low (35% for profit warnings 
and 42% for upgrades), but that the information is value relevant. 
Research done by Patell (1976), Penman (1980), Waymire (1984), and Lev & Penman 
(1990) document that managers disclose good news forecasts more often than bad 
news forecasts and, on average, that there is a positive stock price response to 
managers' earnings forecasts. Collett (2004) disagrees, finding that negative trading 
announcements outnumber positive trading announcements by 50%. Skinner (1994) 
found that share price movements, for bad news disclosures, were more severe than 
for good news disclosures II. He states that "overall, the evidence is consistent with 
the idea that managers face an asymmetric loss function in choosing their voluntary 
disclosure policies. Managers behave as if they bear large costs when investors are 
surprised by large negative earnings news, but not when other earnings news is 
announced." Collett (2004) agrees with these findings, asserting that there is a greater 
reaction to unscheduled announcements which contain a profit warning. Skinner 
(1994) posits two reasons for the severity of bad news announcements; firstly, the 
10 His paper provides evidence on corporate voluntary disclosure practices through an examination of 
the earnings-related disclosures made by a random sample of 93 NASDAQ firms from 1981-1990. 
II Quarterly earnings announcements that convey large negative earnings surprises are pre-empted 
about 25% of the time by voluntary corporate disclosures while other earnings announcements are pre-










threat of litigation by shareholders who may claim that management were "negligent 
on failing to disclose value relevant information", and secondly, managers may incur 
reputation costs for failing to disclose. Collett (2004) agrees, and presents results 
suggesting that managers recognise both the potential legal and reputation costs of 
failing to disclose value relevant information. 
Skinner (1994) asserts that money managers, shareholders, security analysts, and 
other investors dislike negative earnings surprises, and "may impose costs on firms 
whose managers fail to disclose any potential earnings problems in a timely manner". 
Collett (2004) reports, that the directors of firms choosing to disclose trading updates 
to a favoured group of investors may sustain considerable penalties. Lundholm (1996) 
concluded in his study that firms can attract analysts 12, improve the accuracy of 
market expectations, reduce information asymmetries and limit market surprises by 
adopting more forthcoming disclosure practices. He emphasizes that firms with 
prompt disclosure records can lower their cost of capital; as an increase in the 
analysts' confidence in a firm, can result in a larger pool of potential investors. Collett 
(2004) reports extensively on small companies which are not followed by analysts and 
finds that the level of surprise is much greater for small company announcements than 
for large company announcements. Research conducted by Jackson & Madura (2003) 
established similar results. For small companies there is some over-reaction to bad 
news, suggesting either that "large companies manage their disclosures carefully so 
that news trickles out, or that large companies convey information to analysts 
informally more than five days before the public announcement". 
Many directors choose to manage analyst's expectations, through either earmngs 
management l3 or forecast guidance l4, so as to ensure that expectations are always met 
or exceeded (Matsumoto, 2002). Matsumoto (2002) found that firms with "higher 
transient institutional ownership are more likely, and firms with a consistent record of 
prior losses are less likely, to both manage earnings upwards and guide forecasts 
downwards; whereas high growth firms appear to do the opposite". In accordance 
11 Either because these disclosures increase the demand for analyst's reports or because they reduce 
analysts' costs of supplying them. 
13 Achieved when mangers use their discretion over reported earnings to meet expectations. 
I~ Achieved by guiding analysts' earnings forecasts downward to improve their firms' chances of 










with Matsumoto, Aboody & Kazniks (2000) found evidence for the fact that 
managers act opportunistically in structuring the financial reporting strategy of their 
respective firms. 
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is three-fold. Firstly, previous 
studies conducted on profit warnings in South Africa have utilised the JSE All Share 
Index as a proxy for the return on the market, while this paper uses All Share 
Economic Group Indices as the proxy for expected returns. This greatly increases the 
accuracy of the abnormal returns calculated for each industry. Secondly, an 
explanatory variable describing the level of competition in each industry is included 
in the multivariate regression explaining the movement in returns of the non-
announcing firms. Finally, only one similar study has been conducted using South 
African financial data. 
This paper will proceed as follows. Section II describes the large data-set used in the 
study. Section III sets out the methodology employed to test the effects of profit 
warnings on announcing firms and non-announcing firms in the same industry; the 
variables affecting the returns experienced by non-announcing firms over a ten day 
period are also analysed. Section IV reports the market model and regression results, 










II The Data 
A number of sources of data have been used in this study - firstly, the share prices for 
409 public firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) between May 1999 
and February 2004 were obtained from DataStream. Secondly, profit warnings made 
by JSE listed companies between the same dates were collected from McGregor BFA. 
All optional disclosures with repercussions for annual earnings were included; this 
includes both quantitative and qualitative statements. Thirdly, the values for the All 
Share Index and All Share Economic Group Indices between September 1998 and 
March 2004 were gathered. Finally, accounting ratios were obtained for the 409 
public firms considered in this study, more specifically, the earnings/price ratio's 
(EPR), return on equity (ROE), Market Value of Equity and earnings per share (EPS) 
were calculated for each firm. The remainder of this section describes the salient 
features of these sets of data and considers some important aspects in turn. 
2.1 Share Prices 
The share prices considered in this study were the daily share prices obtained from the 
JSE concerning the relevant companies under studylS. The actual share prices utilized 
in the study were those prices for the four days prior to a profit warning up until five 
days post the profit warning. The share prices are stated in South African cents. 
2.2 Pro/it Warnings 
The profit warnings were classified as either containing firm specific information or 
industry-wide common information. This distinction was based on a profit warning 
document which explicitly defines firm specific profit warnings versus industry-wide 
profit warnings. 16 All profit warnings released on the JSE were considered, however 
those with certain characteristics were excluded. Firstly, the occurrence of 
simultaneous announcements by two firms in the same industry was circumvented by 
eliminating both profit warnings from the study. Secondly, announcements made 
15 Share prices were stated for working days only. This excludes weekends and all public holidays, 
since the markets are closed on these days. 
16 See appendix A - The Appendix provides the basis on which profit warnings were classified and lists 










within two days of each other were dropped from the data set. Both prohibiting 
characteristics were implemented so as to ensure that the study considered the effects 
on the market of a single profit warning released by a single firm within a stipulated 
window period. 
In addition, the following forms of announcements were excluded. This was to ensure 
that the study focused on the share price responses to profit warnings only, as 
advocated by Yiannakis (2006) & Gihwala et al (2008). 
• Announcements that provide half year earnings along with a warning 
about future earnings are removed from the sample. 
• Announcements that include other information, such as dividend 
announcements are removed, as the market reaction could not be entirely 
attributed to the warning announcement. 
• Firms exhibiting confounding events were excluded from the dataset. 
These include events such as share repurchase announcements or 
acquisition announcements within a two day window of the profit 
warning. 
• The Diversified Financials industry was excluded from the dataset since a 
strong information transfer effect was not expected to occur in this 
industry. 
• Announcing firms that did not trade on the day of a profit warning were 
also excluded from the data-set. This was due to the fact that there was 
not an expectation of an information transfer since the announcing firm 










2.3 All share index & All Share Economic Group Indices 
All eligible listed compames are included in at least one of the FTSE/JSE Africa 
Headline Indices 17. The eligible companies are ranked by full market capitalization 
(before free float weightings are applied). The top 99% of all companies are included 
in the FTSEIJSE Africa All Share Index (J203) with the remaining 1 % forming the 
FTSEIJSE Africa Fledgling Index. The All share index measures the performance of 
all publicly listed companies at any particular point in time. 
The ten economic group indices used were (including codes): Oil & Gas (J500), Basic 
Materials (J5I0), Industrials (J520), Consumer Goods (J530), Health Care (J540), 
Consumer Services (J550), Telecommunication (J560), Utilities (J570), Financials 
(J580) and Technology (J590). The economic group indices measure the performance 
of a particular economic group at any given point in time. Securities are classified 
according to the FTSE Global Classification System, first into economic groups and 
then into sectors and sub-sectors (The FTSE/JSE Africa Index Series: A 
Comprehensive Guide, 2006)18. 
2.,,/ Accounting Ratios 
The Market value of equity is equivalent to the number of shares issued at the end of 
the year multiplied by the share price at the end of the year. The price-earnings ratio is 
defined as the closing share price on the last day of the company's financial year 
divided by the pre-abnormal earnings per share. Earnings per share is commonly 
calculated as the net profit after tax before, abnormal share prices, less outside equity 
interests and preference dividends, divided by the diluted weighted number of shares 
outstanding during the year. Return on Equity is equal to net profit after tax (NP A T) 
before abnormal share prices, divided by, shareholders equity minus outside equity 
17 CALCULATING THE INDICES: 
All indices in the FTSE/JSE Africa Index Series are calculated between 09hOO and l7hOO on all days 
when the JSE is open for trading. All indices in the series are calculated using the formula: 
Index = Sum of Free Float Market Capitalization of All Constituent Companies 
Latest Index Divisor 











interests. Return on Equity is a key indication of the company's performance as it 
provides information on how well managers are employing funds invested by the 
shareholders to generate returns (Yiannakis, 2006). All accounting ratios are for the 











This paper uses two alternative methods to identify the stock price response of the 
announcing and non-announcing firms to the announcement of a profit warning. 
Firstly, the event study methodology will be used to estimate daily abnormal returns 
for the 10 day window (t-4, t+5). Secondly a cross-sectional regression analysis is 
devised to broadly examine the variables that influence the industry effects of profit 
warnmgs. 
3.1 Event Study Methodology 
Initially, a working set of industry groups was established. These groups were 
established according to the FTSE Global Classification System. A standard event 
study methodology is used to measure share price reactions to the profit warning 
announcements. Day 0 in event time is defined as the date of the earliest profit 
warning report recorded by the JSE. Profit warnings by other firms, recorded in the 
same industry around the original profit warning announcement, days (t-2, t+2), will 
be excluded to ensure that the profit warning of the announcing firm, rather than 
profit warnings of the other firms, is driving the observed market reactions around the 
warning announcement (Yiannakis, 2006). 
The abnormal return for an announcing firm is the deviation of its common share's 
actual return from a contemporary expected return generated by the market model 19 
(Szewczyk, 1992). "Various researchers have tested the validity of using this model 
and all have found it to offer a satisfactory measurement technique" (Firth, 1976). 
Clinch & Sinclair (1987) assert that the results obtained using the market model and 
other methods such as the recursive system are similar. In this study, the market 
model's parameters are estimated over a 250 trading-day estimation period beginning 
250 days prior to the announcement. Abnormal returns are measured over days (t-4, 
t+5) (10 day event window). The test methodology utilised was to calculate the 
cumulative average abnormal returns, which are then used to evaluate the significance 
of the intra-industry information transference. 










The market model parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares applied to 
the following model: 
Where: 
-7 R" is the return for share i at time t. 
-7 RIIII is the market return during the period t measured by the relevant Economic 
Group Index. 
-7 a, is the average rate of return the share would realise in a single time period where 
the market return is zero. 
-7 fJ, is the coefficient of volatility of share i' s return in relation to the market return, 
-7 e'l is the regression residuals. 
The expected normal returns for share i at time t are then calculated by taking the 
expectation of (1), producing the following model: 
Where: 
-7 £( R,I) is the expected return on share i at time t. 
-7 a, and fJ, are the parameters of the market model. 
-7 R
II
" is the market return as already defined. 
To estimate the effects of the profit warning announcement on the announcmg 
firm's returns, abnormal returns are calculated as stipulated by Szewczyk (1992). 
Where: 
-7 A( R,I) is the abnormal share return for share i at time t. 
The remaining variables in the above model are as previously defined2o. 










The average abnormal returns (AAR) for each day and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are estimated over the event period and a students t-test is used to verify 
whether mean and cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant or not. 
1 n 
(4) AAR1 = - I AR;t 
n ;=1 
b 
(5) ACARab = IAAR1 
1=a 
Where: 
-7 AARt is the average abnormal return at time t. 
-7 CARah is the average cumulative abnormal return from time a to time b. 
To ascertain the impact of a profit warning announcement on the share pnce of 
competing firms in the same industry, average abnormal returns are estimated for a 
random sample of competing firms over the ten day event window. In this study, 
industries which contained at least two and not more than ten competing firms, for 
every announcing firm, were considered21 • As this study discriminates between profit 
warnings classified as firm specific and those classified as industry-wide, the above 
analysis is conducted for both cases. 
3.1 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
In order to establish the significance of vanous proposed factors affecting the 
abnormal returns of non-announcing firms, a cross-sectional regression analysis is 
performed. This study considers six explanatory variables, namely: CARA, LNMVE, 
HOMOG, GROWTH, SENT and COMPET22 . The cumulative abnormal returns over 
the two day event window, (t=O, t+ 1), of the non-announcing firms are regressed on 
the six explanatory variables. 
21 As specified in a similar study conducted by Gihwala et al (2008) 










The following model is estimated to examine the six explanatory variables that affect 
the returns of the non-announcing firms over the two day event window: 
(6) 
Where: 
-7 CAR is the two-day (t=O, t+ 1) cumulative abnormal return for the non-announcing 
firms. 
-7 CARA is the two-day (t=O, t+ 1) cumulative abnormal return for the announcing 
firms. 
-7 LNMVE is the size of the firm issuing the profit warning. This is measured by 
taking the natural log of the market value of equity 20 days prior to the profit 
warning announcement, i.e. t-20. 
-7 HOMOG is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for homogeneous industries 
(e.g. Banking, Energy and Utilities industries) and ° otherwise. Homogenous 
industries can be defined as industries that are similar in terms of the product or 
service offering or the general operating environment. 23 Homogeneity of 
industries is controlled for as the level of competition in an industry is an 
important factor in explaining industry abnormal returns (Kohers, 1999). 
-7 GROWTH is a measure of the growth of the announcing firm and is measured 
using the earnings-price ratio (a higher earnings-price ratio implies lower growth). 
The growth of the announcing firm is a proxy for the growth of the entire industry. 
This study controls for a firm's growth prospects, since a profit warning may 
reflect a more severe signal to a high growth industry (Defeo, 1986). 
-7 SENT is an indicator of market sentiment. It provides an indication of the 
underlying 'mood' in the market over the 20 day period prior to the profit warning 
announcement. In this study, market sentiment is estimated by measuring the 
"' Specifically, the Banking and Utility industries are characterised as homogeneous, due to the 
regulatory constraints, greatly limiting the potential to diversify. The Energy industry is characterised 










holding period return on the JSE All Share Index. This study controls for market 
sentiment at the time of each profit warning since a profit warning may result in an 
over-reaction by the market in declining markets (Lang & Stulz, 1992). 
-7 COMPET is a measure of the level competition prevalent in the industry. It is 
measured by using the Herfindahl Index24 of industry concentration25 , which is a 
proxy for the degree of imperfect competition in an industry. In a perfectly 
competitive industry, shareholders of existing firms cannot earn rents from an 
increase in demand. In less competitive industries, however, the increase in 
demand increases the present value of the rents to shareholders because the firms 
whose demand increases, can raise the price for their current output (Lang & 
Stulz, 1992). 
-7 £ is the regression error term. 
IV Results 
24 See Appendix C for explanation of the Herfindahllndex. 
25 The Herfindahl Index of each industry is obtained by dividing an individual firms' market value of 
equity for a given year, by the total industry market value of equity for the same year. This is done for 
each firm in a given industry, resulting in the market share of each firm. The market share of each firm 










The following section initially provides descriptive statistics pertaining to the data-set. 
The abnormal returns calculated for the sample including firm specific and industry-
wide profit warnings (full sample) were then subjected to statistical analysis. The 
sample containing exclusively firm specific profit warnings and the sample containing 
exclusively industry-wide profit warnings were then also tested. Finally, the cross-
sectional regression was conducted to establish the significance of various proposed 
factors affecting the abnormal returns of non-announcing firms. 
-1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
124 profit warnings were assessed in the study; similar to research conducted by 
Gihwala et al (2008). Of these profit warnings, 51 were deemed legitimate as 
delineated in section 1126. The significant reduction in sample size was necessary so as 
to ensure the integrity of the results. More specifically, if the study had been 
conducted on the entire 124 profit warning sample, it would have been impossible to 
establish the true effects of intra-industry information transfers. The breakdown of the 
remaining 51 profit warnings into firm specific and industry-wide profit warnings is 
detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Profit Warnings segmented by source of warning 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Sample by source of warning 
Total Sample 12 23 9 4 3 51 
Industry-Wide 3 7 0 2 13 
Firm Specific 9 16 8 4 38 
A total of 28 industries are represented in the data-set. The frequency distribution of 
industries in which announcing and non-announcing firms are placed, displays a 
relatively even dispersion of profit warning announcements27. There were a total of 
231 non-announcing firms, which were evenly distributed amongst the respective 
industries. The average number of competing firms per profit warning in an industry 
was 4.53. As delineated in the methodology, no less than 2 and no more than 10 
competing firms in an industry, per profit warning, were considered. The diversified 
26 Section 2.2 outlines the filters applied to profit warnings in this study. 










industrials industry contained the highest percentage of total announcing firms with 
9.09%. 11 out of the 24 industries in which profit warnings were made, contained 
only a single announcement. 
After the announcing firms had been positioned into their respective industries, the 
accounting ratios for each of these firms were recorded. Average figures were then 
calculated for each accounting ratio in each industry. Table 2. highlights the average 
market capital, competition levels, price-earnings ratio, return on equity, earnings per 
share (cents) and sentiment levels for each industry. 
Table 2: Accounting Ratios for Announcing Firms 
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performance of the firms in the study. A value of 5147.67 on the Herfindahl index is 
indicative of a relatively low level of competition within the industries under 
examination. The positive price-earnings ratio (6.51) exemplifies the expectation of 
the market, that future earnings are expected to exceed current earnings. Return on 
Equity (ROE) is a key indication of the company's performance as it provides 
information on how well managers are employing funds invested by the shareholders 
to generate returns (Yiannakis, 2006). The positive earnings per share (EPS) and ROE 
ratios are indicative of excellent recent performances for the firms recording profit 
warnings. The Gold Mining sector recorded the highest earnings per share (EPS), 
371.89 cents per share. Whilst the sector exhibiting the highest ROE were the Food 
and Drug Retailers at 43.30%, which was significantly greater than the second highest 
industry, which was Shipping and Ports at 29.02%. The average market sentiment for 
the full sample was found to be slightly negative at -0.02 %. This indicates that the 
'mood' of the market was marginally negative prior to the profit warning 
announcements. 
-1.2 Event Study Results 
The average abnormal returns of firms are now examined. Table 3. reports the 
average abnormal returns, for the period (t-4, t+5), and average cumulative abnormal 
returns around the announcement of 51 profit warnings between January 1999 and 
December 2003. The average abnormal returns for the non-announcing firms at time 
(t) were calculated by summing the abnormal returns of each non-announcing firm in 
an industry, and then dividing this value by the number of non-announcing firms in 
the same industry. The average cumulative abnormal returns are obtained by summing 
the abnormal returns for each day, over an event period. Table 3, 4 and 5. presents the 
average cumulative abnormal returns for the following event periods: (t-l, t=O) (t=O, 
t+l) (t-l, t+l) and (t-2, t+2). The abnormal returns were calculated using the market 










Table 3: Effects on Returns in Response to Profit Warning Announcements - Full 
Sample 
























Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
Day Relative to 
Announcing Firms 
Announcement 
-1 to 0 -19.58% 
o to +1 -7.68% 
-1 to + 1 -15.79% 



















Firstly, the results of the announcing firms will be reported. The largest negative 
abnormal returns for the announcing firms, found to be (-28.42%) occurred at t-3. 
This was closely followed by the large negative abnormal returns at t+4 of (-
25.66%). The large negative abnormal returns may have been exacerbated by the 
general negative sentiment apparent in the market prior to the announcements. 
The average cumulative abnormal returns over a two day period were largest over 
(t-l, t=O) at (-19.58%) in comparison to (-7.68%) for the period (t=O, t+l). The 
market appears to have anticipated the profit warning prior to the announcement 
and therefore adjusted the share price downwards accordingly as proposed by 
Jackson & Madura (2003). It may be the case that information leakages have 
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Table 4: Effects on Returns in Response to Profit Warning Announcements - Firm 
Specific Sample 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 
Day Relative to 
Announcing Firms Non-Announcing Firms 
Announcement 
-4 -4.50% 1.16% 
,., 
0.96% 0.56% -.) 
-2 4.99% -0.41% 
-1 -8.47% -1.03% 
0 0.30% -2.84% 
2.63% -2.10% 
2 -8.81% -5.41% 
,., 
-12.01% -2.70% .) 
4 -7.34% 4.32% 
5 -3.63% 7.18% 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
Day Relative to 
Announcing Firms Non-Announcing Firms 
Announcement 
-1 to 0 -8.17% -3.87% 
o to +1 2.93% -4.94% 
-1 to + 1 -5.54% -5.96% 
-2 to +2 -9.36% -11.79% 
N 38 38 
The 38 firm specific profit warnings were assessed, as shown by Table 4. Again, 
the results of the announcing firms will be reported first. The negative abnormal 
returns for the firm specific sample where less pronounced than those of the full 
sample. The largest negative abnormal returns for the announcing firms, found to 
be (-12.01%) occurred at t+3. This was followed by the negative abnormal 
returns at t+4 of (-8.81 %). The average cumulative abnormal returns were largest 
over the two day period (t-l, t=O) at (-8.17%) in comparison to (2.93%) for the 
period (t=O, t+ 1). At first glance, the market appears, to some extent, to have 
anticipated the profit warning prior to the announcement, shown by the negative 
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Again, the abnormal returns of the non-announcmg firms appear to be 
significantly less pronounced for the firm specific sample. This is as expected, 
since the degree if intra-industry information transfers are expected to be lower 
for firm specific profit warnings. The largest negative abnormal returns recorded 
were at t=2 of (-5.41 %). The largest drop in the share price occurred over the 
period (t=O, t+ 1) of (-4.94%), however a similar drop occurred over the period (t-
1, t=O). The pattern of abnormal returns for non-announcing firms appears to be 
that of positive abnormal returns over the period (t-4, t-3) and (t+4, t+5) and 
negative returns over the period (t-2, t+ 3). This appears to follow a more 
consistent pattern as the negative effects of the profit warnings are centralised 
around the actual announcement date, suggesting some degree if intra-industry 
information transference, however, this effect is small. 
Table 5: Effects on Returns in Response to Profit Warning Announcements - Industry-
Wide Sample 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 
Day Relative to 
Announcing Firms Non-Announcing Firms 
Announcement 
-4 -20.13% -11.27% 
-3 -17.55% -7.81% 
-2 -5.12% -2.92% 
-1 -9.28% -8.21% 
0 -19.09% -19.60% 
1 -7.80% 11.83% 
2 -1.38% 7.77% 
3 8.02% 1.52% 
4 2.61% 3.31% 
5 24.87% 1.53% 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
Day Relative to 
Announcing Firms Non-Announcing Firms 
Announcement 
-1 to 0 -28.37% -27.81% 
o to +1 -26.89% -7.77% 
-1 to + 1 -36.18% -15.97% 
-2 to +2 -42.68% -11.12% 
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Figure 3: AAR and ACAR for Industry-Wide Sample of 
Announcing F irms 












As in the previous two samples, the abnormal returns for the non-announcing firms 
are slightly less pronounced than for the announcing firms, agreeing with the findings 
of Foster (1981). We do however see a similar pattern in the movements of the 
abnormal returns for both types of firms (announcing and non-announcing). The 
largest negative abnormal returns recorded were at t=O of(-19.60%). The largest drop 
in the share price occurred over the period (t- L t+O) of (-27.81 %), which was 
followed by a smaller drop of (-7.77%) over the period (t=O, t+l). The primary 
difference between the pattern followed by the abnormal returns of announcing firms, 
in comparison to those of the non-announcing firms, is that for the non-announcing 
firms, the negative abnormal returns conclude at t=O, and then become positive 
thereafter. This may be due to the fact that the announcing firms are perceived as 
being particularly vulnerable to the recent industry-wide events, and therefore 
experience negative returns for a longer period of time. We do however observe 
significant similarities in the patterns of announcing and non-announcing firms in the 
industry-wide sample; for example the negative abnormal returns for both types of 
firms are similar over the period (t-l, t=O). In addition, similarities can be seen in the 
negative abnormal returns experienced on the day of the profit warnings, for both 
types of firms the value was approximately (-19%), again, showing that information 
transfers are directional. This is evidence of a significant intra-industry information 
transfer and supports the theory that profit warnings convey industry-wide 
information in South Africa. 
-1.3 Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
In this study, six explanatory variables are employed to describe the market reaction 
in non-announcing firms to profit warning announcements. The dependant variable 
used in the regression was the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) of the 
non-announcing firms over the two day period (t=O, t+ 1). Some poignant alterations 
were made to the data-set before the regressions were performed. Firstly, with 
respect to the explanatory variable GROWTH, firms exhibiting negative price-
earnll1gs ratios (PER) were dropped from the data set29 . Secondly, the robust 
standard errors were utilized in the process of running the regressions so as to 
29 A negative PER implies that investors will be given money in exchange for procuring a firms 




















control for heteroscedasticity, which could result in inefficient estimators30 (Gujarati 
pg:394, 2003). The regression results for the firm specific sample are analysed first, 
Table 6, followed by the results for the industry-wide sample, Table 7. 
Table 6: Multivariate Cross-Sectional Regression - Firm Specific Sample 
Number of 
Observations 









Coefficient Robust Standard Error t-statistic P-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
-0.059 0.085 -0.690 ** 0.045 -0.232 
0.024 0.029 0.840 0.406 -0.035 
-0.242 0.093 -2.610 ** 0.014 -0.431 
-0.143 0.701 -0.200 0.84 -1.571 
0.014 0.021 -0.480 0.637 0.000 
0.097 0.114 -0.840 0.405 0.000 
-0.031 0.265 0.120 0.907 -0.509 
Note: The t-statistics are calculated using White-corrected standard errors. *** Indicates statistical 
significance at the I % level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
The firm specific sample contained 38 profit warnings. The F-statistic of the model 
(10.5) and its accompanying P-value prove the model to be highly significant, despite 
the seemingly low R-squared value3' of (23.3%). Therefore we can conclude that the 
model possesses significant explanatory power. 
CARA: the cumulative abnormal returns of the announcing firms are significant at the 
5% significance level, given a P-value of (0.045). The coefficient of (-0.059) indicates 
that the non-announcing firms' cumulative abnormal returns increase as a result of a 
profit warning announcement conveying firm specific information. This provides 
evidence of a competitive effect, in which rival firms' react favourably to a 
pessimistic announcement from a firm in the same industry. This is in accordance 
with Clinch & Sinclair (1987) and Helbok & Walker (2003) who found that 
information transfers were directional. 
30 Heteroscedasticity is typically present in cross-sectional data-sets. 
31 R-squared (Coefficient of Determination) is a summary measure that tells how well the sample 

















LNMVE: the size of the announcing firm is insignificant in explaining the variation in 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms. 
HOMOG: the homogeneity of an industry is significant at the 5% level. The P-value 
of (0.014) suggests that this variable is highly significant in explaining the abnormal 
returns of the non-announcing firms in the firm specific sample. If a profit warning is 
reported by a firm in a homogenous industry, the abnormal returns of the competing 
firms in the same industry decrease by 0.242%. This provides evidence that the higher 
the degree of industry homogeneity, the more negative the cumulative abnormal 
returns of non-announcing firms. These results counter our expectation of a positive 
relationship between the cumulative abnormal return of the non-announcing firms and 
the degree of industry homogeneity. The movement in the presence of homogeneity is 
small, possibly due to the limited degree of intra-industry information transference. 
GROWTH: the growth of the announcing firm is insignificant in explaining the share 
price movements of the non-announcing firms. 
SENT: market sentiment appears to be highly insignificant and does not contribute to 
the explanatory power of the model. 
COMPET: competition, measured by the Herfindahl Index, IS insignificant III the 
model of firm specific profit warnings. 




















Coefficient Robust Standard Error t-statistic P-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
0.445 0.222 2.010 * 0.092 -0.098 
0.003 0.035 0.080 0.937 -0.083 
0.444 0.424 1.050 ** 0.035 -0.594 
-0.205 0.921 -0.220 0.832 -2.458 
0.072 0.093 0.920 * 0.092 0.000 
0.004 0.015 0.320 0.762 0.000 
-0.007 0.288 0.020 0.981 -0.697 
Note: The t-statistics are calculated using White-corrected standard errors. *** Indicates statistical 
significance at the I % level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
The industry-wide sample contained 13 profit warnings. The F -statistic of the model 

















R-squared value of (57.6%) is relatively high, indicating that the model explains over 
half of the variation in the cumulative abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms. 
CARA: the cumulative abnormal returns of the announcing firms are significant at the 
10% significance level, with a P-value of (0.092). The coefficient is positive and less 
than one, indicating that the non-announcing firms' cumulative abnormal returns 
decrease as a result of a profit warning announcement conveying industry-wide 
information, however to a lesser extent than the negative reaction in the announcing 
firms. This suggests a greater degree of intra-industry information transfers, in the 
case of profit warnings conveying industry-wide information, which was expected. 
This apparent contagion effect is in accordance with lin (2004), Szewczyk (1992) and 
Tawatnuntachai & D'Mello (2002). 
LNMVE: again, the size of the announcing firm is insignificant in explaining the 
variation in the cumulative abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms. 
HOMOG: the homogeneity of an industry is again significant at the 5% level. The P-
value of (0.035) suggests that this variable is highly significant in explaining the 
abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms in the industry-wide sample. If a profit 
warning is reported by a firm in a homogenous industry, the abnormal returns of the 
competing firms in the same industry increase by 0.444%. This provides evidence that 
the higher the degree of industry homogeneity, the less negative the cumulative 
abnormal returns of non-announcing firms. These results concur with our expectation 
of a positive relationship between the cumulative abnormal return of the non-
announcing firms and the degree of industry homogeneity (Kohers, 1999). Thus, 
competing firms in homogeneous industries react less negatively to profit warnings 
that are issued for industry-wide reasons than do firms in less homogeneous 
industries. This is as a result of a more profound competitive effect in homogenous 
industries. 
GROWTH: again, the growth of the announcing firm is insignificant in explaining the 
share price movements of the non-announcing firms. 
SENT: market sentiment appears to be significant at the 10% level and therefore 
contributes to the explanatory power of the model. The P-value of (0.092) suggests 
that the 'mood' in the market over the 20 days prior to the profit warnings affects the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms. This appears to provide 










announcement of a profit warnmg that conveys industry-wide information, IS 
attenuated when the recent market sentiment has been positive. 
COMPET: again, the measurement of competition provided by the Herfindahl Index 










V Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has applied statistical techniques to the abnormal returns of announcing 
and non-announcing firms as well as to a number of accounting ratios, to determine 
whether or not profit warnings convey industry-wide information in South Africa. 
The results for the AAR and ACAR for the firm specific sample highlighted the 
following points: For the announcing firms, the pattern of abnormal returns followed 
appeared to be frenzied. Jackson & Madura's (2003) research of profit warnings 
claimed that the signal conveyed in a profit warning is uncertain because the market 
may have anticipated the information from other news disseminated about a firm, an 
industry, or the general economy. The positive abnormal returns experienced on the 
day of the profit warning announcement, and the delayed negative abnormal returns 
seen from t+2 onwards, seem to typify this element of uncertainty. A possible 
explanation for this, in this study, was that the market may have been waiting to see 
the widespread effects of the profit warning on the entire industry before acting. 
Nevertheless, the movements of the share prices seem to reflect an eventual large drop 
in abnormal returns for the announcing firms, perhaps as a result of the initial under-
reaction to the profit warning. This is in accordance with research conducted by 
Collett (2004). 
As was expected, and in accordance with Foster (1981), the AAR for the non-
announcing firms were less pronounced than the announcing firms in the firm specific 
sample. The degree of intra-industry information transference was evidently small. 
However, there was no evidence of a competitive effect, but instead evidence of a 
marginal contagion effect, as the AAR of non-announcing firms over the period 
acutely around t=O were negative. 
The industry-wide sample proved to demonstrate the expected outcome. Profit 
warnings conveying industry-wide information were anticipated earlier by the market 
and therefore negative AAR were seen as early as t-4. The finding of significant 
negative abnormal returns in the days leading up to the announcement day provides 
evidence of some information leakage. This is consistent with the results of Jackson 










industry-wide information is more easily anticipated by the market, and therefore the 
AAR of the non-announcing firms were also seen to exhibit negative trends prior to 
the announcement. The similarity between the patterns of announcing and non-
announcing firms' AAR within this sample provides evidence of a significant intra-
industry information transfer in South Africa. A recovery, post announcement, in 
terms of AAR, was noticed for both the announcing and non-announcing firms 
suggesting an overreaction by the market to the profit warning. 
The analysis of the AAR and ACAR for the full sample was an amalgamation of the 
results for the firm specific sample and industry-wide sample. As a result, the full 
sample follows a combination of the two AAR patterns. The initial negative AAR was 
observed from t-4 up until t=O for the announcing firms, which is in accordance with 
the expected outcome as a combination of information leakage and commonly known 
industry-wide information result in an early anticipation of the profit warning. After 
t=O, we see the dominant effect of the firm-specific sample for the announcing firms 
as AAR remain predominantly negative up until t+4, at which point we eventually see 
positive AAR. The large negative abnormal returns post announcement may have 
been the result of the general negative sentiment apparent in the market prior to the 
announcements. 
The AAR for non-announcing firms in the full sample of profit warnings appears to 
make little sense. The abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms were 
significantly less pronounced than those of the announcing firms. The results did 
show negative abnormal returns over the period (t-l, t=O), which were expected. 
However, it is difficult to discern any meaningful conclusions based on the erratic 
nature of the AAR of the non-announcing firms in the full sample. A possible 
explanation for the apparent randomness of the AAR in the full sample is that the firm 
specific sample (n=38) was nearly three times the size of the industry-wide sample 
(n=13). This would lead to the dominance of the pattern visible in the AAR of the 
firm specific sample. This adds further impetus to the notion proposed by Foster 
(1981) and lin (2004), asserting that some profit warnings convey firm specific 
information and others industry-wide information, thus implying that the two different 











The cross-sectional regression analysis produced interesting results for both the firm 
specific sample and the industry-wide sample. For the firm specific sample of profit 
warnings, the size of the announcing firms (LNMVE) was not a significant 
contributor to the cumulative abnormal return of the non-announcing firms; this 
counters findings by Defeo (1986). The same was the case for the GROWTH and 
SENT variable. With regards to the insignificance of the SENT variable, this could be 
due to the nature of firm specific information, that is, the bad news contained in profit 
warnings are specific to the announcing firm alone even given all recent conditions of 
market sentiment. This study was the first to include an explanatory variable detailing 
the level of competition (COMPET) in each industry in South Africa. The results 
confirm that the competitive nature of an industry has no significant effect on the 
reaction of competing firms in an industry to a profit warning; this in contradiction to 
the findings of Foster (1981) and Kohers (1999). The Cumulative abnormal returns of 
the announcing firms (CARA) were found to influence the abnormal returns of the 
non-announcing firms. Thus, if the profit warning conveys firm specific information, 
the results provide evidence of a competitive effect, in which rival firms react 
favourably to a pessimistic announcement from a firm in the same industry. This 
outcome was as expected. In a homogenous industry, the negative reaction of non-
announcing firms is more severe in the firm-specific sample. The marginal effect on 
the announcing firms' abnormal returns in a homogenous environment was found to 
be small, but negative. In a homogenous industry, the products and services offered 
by firms are similar. This suggests that the market perceives a pessimistic 
announcement by one firm as an indication of the potentially poor performance of 
competing firms in the same industry (contagion effect). This countered the argument 
by Collett (2004) and instead seems to suggest that non-announcing firms in 
industries characterised by homogeneity, experience a more severe negative reaction 
to abnormal returns. 
The cross-sectional regression model on the industry-wide sample of profit warnings 
was found to be significant. Again, the size of the announcing firms (LNMVE), 
GROWTH and the competition variable COMPET were found to be poor explanatory 
variables. The average cumulative abnormal returns of the announcing firms 










firms. Thus, if the profit warnmg contains new industry related information, the 
announcement will result in the market inflicting more damage on the industry. This 
is what was expected, as the profit warnings in this sample, conveyed information 
about the entire industry and not just the announcing firm. Again, the homogeneity of 
the industry affects the AAR of the non-announcing firms. However, in this sample 
the direction of the movements in abnormal returns were found to be positive in a 
homogenous environment. Thus the negative AAR of non-announcing firms is 
attenuated in homogenous industries. This provides evidence that homogeneous 
industries provide an environment conducive to competitive reactions. That is, rival 
firms in homogeneous industries react less negatively to profit warnings that are 
issued for industry-wide reasons than do firms in less homogeneous industries. The 
positive coefficient of the market sentiment variable (SENT) for this sample of profit 
warnings provides evidence that the negative AAR reaction in non-announcing firms 
is attenuated when the recent market sentiment has been positive. That is, the market 
punishes competing firms to a lesser extent when market sentiment is relatively 
favourable. 
In conclusion, the results seem to support the hypothesis that profit warnings convey 
industry-wide information in South Africa. In particular, the sample of industry-wide 
profit warnings were shown to affect the share prices of all competing firms in a given 
industry. The firm-specific sample seemed to be characterised by a market hesitant to 
react hastily to profit warnings conveying exclusively firm relevant information, with 
limited intra-industry information transference. Further investigations would greatly 
assist these results, as up to this date, limited research has been conducted on this 
subject in South Africa. Extending the period of profit warnings under observation, as 
well as increasing the number of industry-wide profit warning cases, would provide a 
more lucid view on the subject. The model, breaking down the potential causes of 
reactions in the abnormal returns of the non-announcing firms, could also be extended 
to increase explanatory power. The addition of more relevant explanatory variables 
would serve to assist analysts and shareholders in better understanding the 
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Appendix A: Profit Warning Classification 
A.I. Characteristics of Industry-Wide and Firm Specific Profit Warnings 
Table AI. provides the basis on which profit warnings were classified into the 
industry-wide and firm specific groups as suggested by Yiannakis (2006). The 
classification is based on the content of the profit warning announcement released to 
the market. 
Table A. 1 Classification of Profit Warnings into Industry-Wide and Firm Specific 
Groups 
Firm Specific 
Production & Quality problems 
Accounting Errors/Difficulties 
Litigation costs 
Delays to contracts and negotiations 
Loss of major customer 
Restructuring costs 
Acquisition/mergers costs 
Problems with contracts and negotiations 
Management and systems problems 
Fraud/Theft 
Repair/remedial works 
HR difficulties - hiring/retrenching staff 
Industry-Wide 
Difficult Market/Trading Conditions 
Regulation/Legislation 
Adverse weather conditions 
Sales short of forecasts 
Detrimental national or global 
economIc occurrences 
A.2. Examples of Profit Warnings and their Classification 
-+ Profit Warning announcement by Growthpoint Properties Limited 
(GRT) (10 February 2000) 
Shareholders are advised that negotiations are in progress with regard to the 










successfully concluded may have a material effect on the price of the company's 
shares. Shareholders are therefore advised to exercise caution in their dealings in 
synergy shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange until a full announcement is 
made. Shareholders are further warned that the disposal of dexterous combined with 
a slow-down in business over December and January, primarily related to 'y2k' 
activity, has obliged the company to revise its forecast headline earnings per share 
for the year to 29 February 2000 from 5.38 cents down to -1.0 cents. 
The above announcement was determined to represent 'restructuring costs' associated 
with the firm. These costs will affect the share price of Growthpoint Properties 
Limited. 
Class(fication: Firm Specific 
~ Profit Warning announcement by Kairos Holdings Limited (KIR) (25 
February 2000) 
Acuity shareholders are advised that the earnings for the group for the six months 
ended 31 December 1999, have been affected by certain subsidiaries acquired at 
listing not pel/orming as per their forecasts. These subsidiaries have been disposed of 
prior to year-end and certain unforeseen costs have been incurred as a result of their 
di!'JjJosallclosing down. As such acuity will not achieve the earnings growth forecasted 
in its prospectus dated 17 may J 999. De.\pite the above, it is expected that the acuity 
group will still achieve positive earnings growth for the six months to December 1999 
in excess of the corre!'JjJonding period in the previous financial year. Acuity has been 
re-organised into four business units. All of these business units contributed positively 
to earnings growth fiJr the period to 31 December 1999. Acuity will release its 
audited.financial results in the first week of March 2000. 
The above announcement was determined to represent 'sales short of forecasts' as the 
subsidiaries are not performing as per their forecasts. These costs will affect the share 





















































Appendix B: Division of Sectors and Sub-Sectors into All Share Economic 
Group Indices 
Table B. 2 FTSE Global Classification System (The FTSEIJSE Africa Index Series: 
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Appendix C: The Herfindahl Index 
C.l. Explanation of the Method of Measurement and Use of the Herjindahl Index 
The Herfindahl index, also known as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI, is a 
measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the 
amount of competition among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of each individual firm. It can range from 0 to 10,000 moving from a 
very large amount of very small firms (highly competitive industry) to a single 
monopolistic producer. Increases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a decrease 
in competition and an increase of market power, whereas decreases indicate the 
opposite. The major benefit of the Herfindahl index is that it gives more weight to 
larger firms ("Herfindahl Index", retrieved on November 7, 2008, from Wikipedia: 
http://www.wikipedia.com). 
C.2. Examples of Herjindahl Index Calculations 
Example 
For instance, two cases in which the six largest firms produce 90 % of the output: 
• Case 1: All six firms produce 15% each, and 
• Case 2: One firm produces 80 % while the five others produce 2 % each. 
We will assume that the remaining 10% of output is divided among 10 equally sized 
producers. The six-firm concentration ratio would equal 90 % for both case 1 and case 
2, but in the first case competition would be fierce where the second case approaches 
monopoly. The Herfindahl index for these two situations makes the lack of 
competition in the second case strikingly clear: 
• 
• 
Case 1: Herfindahl index = 6 * 152 + 10 * 12 = 1360 
Case 2: Herfindahl index = 802 + 5 * 22 + 10 * 12 = 6430 
This behaviour rests in the fact that the market shares are squared prior to being 










Appendix D: Frequency Distribution of Industries for Announcing and Non-
Announcing Firms. 
D.l. Filters Applied to the Data-Set 
A (*) is indicative of a scenario in which an industry experienced more than one profit 
warning. As explained in Section II, these scenarios resulted in the second profit 
warning and the announcing firm being excluded from the data-set. In all of the below 
industries, the number of non-announcing firms was at least 2 and no more than 10. 





Building & Con~truction Materials 
Business Support Scnices 
Chemicals - Special it) 
Computer Services 





Engineering - General 
Fanning & Fishing 
Food & Drug Retailers 
Gold Mining 
Insurance - Non-Lik 
Inve,tment Banks 
Inve,tment Com(XUlies 
Metals & Minerals 
Other Construction 
Other Financial 
Publishing & Printing 
Real Estate Holdings & Development 
Restaurants and Pubs 
Retai lers - Ilardi inL's 
Retailers - Multi DepartlTlt_'Ilt 
Rdailers - Son Goods 
Shipping & Ports 
Total: 28 defined industries 
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